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Abstract. The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in
cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows to
compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness axioms.
However, in many realistic applications where externalities are present, Shap-
ley’s axioms fail to indicate such a unique division. Consequently, there are many
extensions of Shapley value to the environment with externalities proposed in
the literature built upon additional axioms. Two important such extensions are
“externality-free” value by Pham Do and Norde and value that “absorbed all ex-
ternalities” by McQuillin. They are good reference points in a space of potential
payoff divisions for coalitional games with externalities as they limit the space
at two opposite extremes. In a recent, important publication, De Clippel and
Serrano presented a marginality-based axiomatization of the value by Pham Do
Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual approach to marginality which allows
us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus, we close the picture outlined by De
Clippel and Serrano.
1 Introduction
The Shapley value is one of the most important and extensively studied solution con-
cepts in coalitional game theory. In the environment where agents are allowed to co-
operate, the Shapley value lays down a fair allocation of jointly achieved payoff. Here,
fairness is built upon four axioms: (i) Efficiency (the whole payoff is distributed among
agents); (ii) Symmetry (division of payoff does not depend on agents’ names), (iii) Ad-
ditivity (when two different games are combined, agent’s share is equal to sum of shares
in games considered independently); and (iv) Null-player Axiom (agent which has no
impact on value of any coalition gets nothing). In his seminal work, Shapley showed
that his division scheme is unique, i.e. no other division scheme meets all four axioms.
Since Shapley original work [1], his concept has been extended in a variety of direc-
tions. One of them are coalitional games with externalities, where a value of a coalition
depends on formation of other coalitions in the system. Indeed, externalities occur in
many real-life applications of coalitional games such as oligopolistic markets (where a
merger is likely to affect other companies), a political scene (where the importance of
a political party highly depends on the created coalitions), or a supply chain (where
a large number of subcontractors increases the standardization costs). Unfortunately,
they are substantially more challenging to the model than the conventional games. In
particular, in the presence of externalities, the axioms proposed by Shapley are in-
sufficient to determine a unique division of payoff. This problem was addressed in the
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literature by several authors who proposed more extended axiomatizations. Two impor-
tant extensions of the Shapley value to games with externalities are “externality-free”
value proposed by Pham Do and Norde [3] and McQuillin’s value which “absorbed all
externalities” [2]. Both can be considered as reference points for other extensions, as,
under certain conditions, they limit the space of possible extensions at two opposite
extremes.
The key role in the formula for the Shapley value is played by the marginality —
an important economic concept in which evaluation of a player in a coalition is based
on a difference between the coalition’s values with and without the player. Specifically,
the Shapley value is calculated as the weighted average of marginal contributions of
players to all the coalitions in the game. This relationship of the Shapley value to the
marginality was emphasized by the beautiful work of Young [8]. In Shapley’s axiomatic
characterizationmarginality comes from the Null-player Axiom which assigns zero value
to every agent whose vector of marginal contributions to coalitions equals to zero.
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, this axiom as well as the others do not determine
the unique value in the case of games with externalities. Thus, it became a common
practise in the literature, to add other, non-marginality based axioms. These axioms
indeed allow for deriving the unique Shapley value extended to games with externalities,
however, not in a way related to marginality as the original Shapley value did. In this
context, the key additional axiom of McQuillin was recursion which required the value
to be a fixed-point solution (i.e. if we consider a value to be a game by itself, then the
value computed for such a game should not change). Nevertheless, marginality-based
axiomatization of the McQuillin value that connects to the original Shapley value has
remained unknown.
In this paper we close this gap by proposing an alternative approach to marginality.
We present a new marginality axiom, which allows us to derive the extension of the
Shapley value proposed by McQuillin. Our approach is dual to De Clippel and Serrano
who in recent, important publication proposed a basic approach to marginality and
derived “externality-free” value of Pham Do and Norde. In other words, we close the
picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano, so that the two opposite values for games
with externalities that limit the space of many other extensions, are now based on the
marginality principle.
Our new approach to marginality, which we call a steady marginality, differs from
those proposed earlier in the literature ([5,7,6]). To compute an agent’s marginal contri-
bution to a coalition we compare the value of the coalition with the specific agent with
the value of the coalition obtained by the transfer of the agent to another coalition,
existing in the partition (so the number of coalitions is steady). We then do not include
the value of a coalition in a partition when a specific agent forms its own singleton
coalition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic
definitions and notation. In Section 3 we present our set of axioms, including our new
marginality axiom which we relate to “externality-free” marginality. In Section 4 we
define a new class of games and prove they form a basis of space of games with exter-
nalities. Finally, in Section 5 we prove that there exists only one value which satisfies all
our axioms and that this value is equal to one proposed earlier by McQuillin. Section 6
presents different approaches to marginality in the literature. Section 7 concludes the
paper and outlines future work.
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2 Definitions and Notation
In this section we introduce the basic definitions and notation.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of all agents. A coalition S is any subset of agents,
S ⊆ N . A partition P of N is a set of disjoint coalitions which covers the whole set
of agents, i.e., P = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} and
⋃
i∈N Si = N , where Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for every
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j. The set of all partitions is denoted by P . A coalition S
being a part of a partition P is called an embedded coalition and is denoted by (S, P ).
By |P | we denote the number of coalitions in a partition P . The set of all embedded
coalitions is denoted EC and formally defined as:
EC
def
= {(S, P ) : P ∈ P , S ∈ P}
As common in the literature, for S ⊂ N, i 6∈ S, j ∈ S, we define S+i
def
= S ∪ {i} and
S−j
def
= S \ {j}. If S ∈ P then P−S
def
= P \ {S}.
The following notation will play an important part in our paper: let S, T ∈ P and
i ∈ S. A function τS,Ti will represent the transition of an agent i from S to T :
τ
S,T
i (P )
def
= P \ {S, T } ∪ {S−i, T+i}
In the literature it is a common convention to assume that in every partition P ∈ P
an empty, artificial coalition ∅ ∈ P exists. In our paper we accept a different assumption
that only one partition (the one with the grand-coalition) contains a special empty
coalition ∅.
Note 2.1. For technical convenience, in our paper we use the convention that in every
partition there are at least two coalitions, so we assume that in partition with only
one explicitly listed coalition there also exists an empty coalition. In such a case, the
grand coalition takes the form {N, ∅} (and |{N, ∅}| = 2). However, we will not consider
(∅, {N, ∅}) as a correct embedded coalition.
The game (in a partition-function form) is a function v : EC → R which associates
a real number with every embedded coalition. For convenience, we extend the domain
of v and assign a zero value to every incorrect embedded coalition where S is empty:
v(∅, P ) = 0.
Among a collection of games we distinguish a set of games without externalities
(or, differently, characteristic function games), where the value of a coalition does not
depend on a partition of other agents. Formally, for each coalition S and two partitions
P1, P2 containing S we get v(S, P1) = v(S, P2). In this case the definition of a game can
be simplified to vˆ : 2N → R, as the only argument is a coalition S. Conversely, we say
that the game is with externalities when the value for at least one coalition depends on
a structure of other agents: v(S, P1) 6= v(S, P2) for some S and P1, P2 which contain S.
The value of the game is a function which assigns some payoff to every agent:
ϕ : v → RN . This payoff is meant to be the agent’s share in the value achieved by all
players united in the grand coalition: v(N, {N, ∅}). We are interested in a division of
the payoff which is fair.
The Shapley value is defined as:
Shi(vˆ) =
∑
S⊆N,i∈S
(|S| − 1)!(|N | − |S|)!
|N |!
(vˆ(S)− vˆ(S−i))
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where by vˆ we denote the game without externalities.
Shapley presented the following intuition behind his value. Assume that the agents
enter the coalition in random order. Every agent i brings to the set S−i of agents
who already entered the coalition its marginal contribution vˆ(S) − vˆ(S−i). Therefore,
Shapley value of an agent i is the average of all its marginal contributions for every
order of the agents’ arrivals.
One of the most common approaches to the extension of Shapley value for games
with externalities is the average approach proposed by Macho-Stadler et al [4]. In
this approach, from the game v we create a simpler game vˆ without externalities
and define ϕi(v)
def
= Shi(vˆ). The value of each coalition S in vˆ is computed as the
weighted average of values of a coalition S embedded in different partitions: vˆ(S) =∑
P∈P,S∈P α(S,P ) · v(S, P ). The different weights lead to the different values. Two ex-
tremes in those approaches are “externality-free” value and value which “absorbed all
externalities”.
The first one was proposed by Pham Do and Norde. It can be obtained using the
average approach by defining vˆfree(S)
def
= v(S, {{i} : i ∈ N−S} ∪ {S}) and ϕ
free
i (v)
def
=
Shi(vˆ
free). Hence, the value of S is taken from the partition, in which no externalities
from merging coalitions affect it.
The second one, proposed by McQuillin, is dual to Pham Do and Norde. Here, the
value of S is taken from the partition, in which all other agents are in one coalition:
vˆMcQ(S)
def
= v(S, {N−S, S}). As we can see, this value of S is affected by all externalities
from merging coalitions. McQuillin value takes the form ϕMcQi (v)
def
= Shi(vˆ
McQ).
Example 2.2. Consider a simple, 3-player game:
pi1 = {{1}, {2}, {3}} v({1}, pi1) = 4 v({2}, pi1) = 2 v({3}, pi1) = 3
pi2 = {{1}, {2, 3}} v({1}, pi2) = 2 v({2, 3}, pi2) = 5
pi3 = {{1, 3}, {2}} v({1, 3}, pi3) = 7 v({2}, pi3) = 0
pi4 = {{1, 2}, {3}} v({1, 2}, pi4) = 6 v({3}, pi4) = 2
pi5 = {{1, 2, 3}, ∅} v({1, 2, 3}, pi5) = 10
Then, games vˆfree and vˆMcQ are calculated as follows:
vˆfree({1}) = v({1}, pi1) = 4 vˆ
McQ({1}) = v({1}, pi2) = 2
vˆfree({2}) = v({2}, pi1) = 2 vˆ
McQ({2}) = v({2}, pi3) = 0
vˆfree({3}) = v({3}, pi1) = 3 vˆ
McQ({3}) = v({3}, pi4) = 2
vˆfree({1, 2}) = v({1, 2}, pi4) = 6 vˆ
McQ({1, 2}) = v({1, 2}, pi4) = 6
vˆfree({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}, pi3) = 7 vˆ
McQ({1, 3}) = v({1, 3}, pi3) = 7
vˆfree({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}, pi2) = 5 vˆ
McQ({2, 3}) = v({2, 3}, pi2) = 5
vˆfree({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}, pi5) = 10 vˆ
McQ({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 3}, pi5) = 10
Based on standard Shapley value: ϕfree = (266 ,
14
6 ,
20
6 ) and ϕ
McQ = (256 ,
13
6 ,
22
6 ).
3 Axiomatic Characterization
In this section we will present our axioms including a new definition of the marginal
contribution. We will also briefly compare it to the definition proposed by De Clippel
and Serrano.
Shapley value is based on four elementary axioms: Efficiency, Symmetry, Additivity
and Null-player Axiom. The first three are easily translated to games with externalities.
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Definition 3.1. (Efficiency) Function ϕ satisfies Efficiency if the whole payoff is dis-
tributed among agents, i.e.
∑
i∈N ϕi(v) = v(N, {N, ∅}) for every game v.
Let σ : N → N be a permutation of the set of agents. Then
– for every coalition S ⊆ N , σ(S)
def
= {σ(i) : i ∈ S}
– for every partition P ∈ P , σ(P )
def
= {σ(S) : S ∈ P} .
The permutation of game σ(v) is a game defined on every embedded coalition by
σ(v)(S, P )
def
= v(σ(S), σ(P )) and the permutation of σ(ϕ(v)) is the vector (ϕσ(i)(v))i∈N .
Definition 3.2. (Symmetry) Function ϕ satisfies Symmetry if agents’ values do not
depend on their names, i.e. ϕ(σ(v)) = σ(ϕ(v)) for every game v and every permuta-
tion σ.
It is widely accepted ([5,4,2]) to translate Additivity as the Linearity in the context
of externalities.1
Definition 3.3. (Linearity) Function ϕ satisfies Linearity if:
(a) for every two games v1, v2, we have ϕ(v1 + v2) = ϕ(v1) + ϕ(v2), where v1 + v2 is a
game defined by (v1 + v2)(S, P ) = v1(S, P ) + v2(S, P )
(b) for every game v and constant λ ∈ R, we have ϕ(λv) = λ · ϕ(v), where λv is a
game defined by (λv)(S, P ) = λ · v(S, P ).
Our key axiom will be based on the marginality principle. When there are no
externalities, the marginal contribution of an agent i to a coalition S can be easily
calculated as a difference between the coalition value with and without an agent i:
vˆ(S) − vˆ(S−i). But when the externalities exist, the value of a coalition S (embedded
in P ) without an agent i depends on where the agent i is. Let us define the elementary
marginal contribution mc(i,S,P,T ) of an agent i to (S, P ) in comparison to i being
in T ∈ P−S ∪ {∅} as a difference between the value of (S, P ) and (S−i, τ
S,T
i (P )).
Then the marginal contribution is the (weighted) average of the elementary marginal
contributions:
mc(i,S,P )(v) =
∑
T∈P−S∪{∅}
α(i,S,P,T )(v(S, P )− v(S−i, τ
S,T
i (P )))
The empty set in the sum corresponds to the partition in which i is in a singleton
coalition {i}.2 For our later discussion it would be convenient to consider the elementary
marginal contribution v(S, P )− v(S−i, τ
S,T
i (P )) as a cost of the agent’s i transfer to a
coalition T .
1 Shapley based his value on Additivity – part (a) of our axiom – as it (combined with his
three other axioms) implies part (b) – a very intuitive assumption that when we multiply
every value in the game by some scalar, agents’ share will increase respectively (i.e. the ratio
of agents’ share will not change). As shown in [4], the standard Shapley’s axioms translated
to the games with externalities are too weak to imply full Linearity. Thus, in the presence
of externalities, Additivity is usually strengthened to the Linearity.
2 Note that when (S, P ) = (N, {N, ∅}) then P−S ∪ {∅} = {∅}, so mc(i,N,{N,∅})(v) =
α(i,N,{N,∅},∅)(v(N, {N, ∅}) − v(N−i, {N−i, {i}})).
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De Clippel and Serrano used only one non-zero weight for the transfer of i to the
empty coalition: α(i,S,P,∅) = 1 and α(i,S,P,T ) = 0 for T ∈ P−S . Their definition of the
marginal contribution takes the form:
mc
free
(i,S,P )(v)
def
= v(S, P )− v(S−i, P−S ∪ {S−i, {i}})
This approach is justified by treating the transfer as a two-step process. In the first
step, agent i leaves the coalition S and for a moment remains alone (i.e., creates a
singleton coalition). An optional second step consists of agent i joining some coalition
from P−S (in coalition terms, {i} merges with some other coalition). Although both
steps may change the value of S−i, the authors argue that only the first one corresponds
to the intrinsic marginal contribution – the influence from the second step comes
rather from the external effect of merging coalitions, not from i leaving S. Discarding
the impact of merging coalitions in marginal contribution allowed them to derive an
“externality-free” value.
We will consider the transfer of i in a different way. Our first step will consist of
leaving coalition S and joining one of the other coalitions in partition. In the second
step, agent i can exit his new coalition and create his own. Thus, we look at creating
new coalition as an extra action, which should not be included in the effect of i leaving
coalition S. According to this, the natural way to define the steady marginal contri-
bution of an agent i to (S, P ), is to take into account only the transfer to the other
existing coalition.
Definition 3.4. The steady marginal contribution of an agent i ∈ S to the embedded
coalition (S, P ) ∈ EC is defined as:
mc
full
(i,S,P )(v)
def
=
∑
T∈P−S
(v(S, P )− v(S−i, τ
S,T
i (P )))
Then, mcfulli (v)
def
= (mcfull(i,S,P )(v))(S,P )∈EC,i∈S is a vector of steady marginal contribu-
tions.
Our approach can be justified by these real life examples in which creation of a
new coalition is rare and not likely. These include political parties or million-dollar
industries (such as oil oligopoly). In all such situations, our approach is likely to lead
to more proper results.
Based on the definition of steady marginal contribution we can introduce the last ax-
iom, which is our version of the standard Null-player Axiom. In the literature on games
with externalities, it is common to assume ([4,5]) that agent i is a null-player when all of
his elementary marginal contributions are equal to zero (v(S, P )− v(S−i, τ
S,T
i (P )) = 0
for each (S, P ) ∈ EC such that i ∈ S and T ∈ P−S ∪{∅}). Our definition of null-player
will differ – we will consider an agent as a null-player when all of his steady marginal
contributions are equal to zero.3
Definition 3.5. (Null-player Axiom in a steady marginal contribution sense) Function
ϕ satisfies Null-player Axiom if for every agent i such that vector of steady marginal
contributions mcfulli (v) is a zero vector occurs ϕi(v) = 0.
3 It is easy to prove that our axiom strengthens the standard one, as the fact that all of the
agent’s i elementary marginal contributions equal zero implies that all his steady marginal
contributions are equal to zero as well.
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4 Constant-Coalition Games
In this section we will introduce a new class of simple games – constant-coalition games.
This games will play a key role in a proof of the uniqueness of the value in the next
section. The name comes from the fact that, in a given game, every partition in which a
coalition with non-zero value is embedded, has exactly the same number of coalitions.
We show that the collection of such games is a basis of partition function games.
First, we will need some additional notation.
Definition 4.1. (R1  R2) Let R1, R2 be two proper, non-empty subsets of two parti-
tions. We say that R2 can be reduced to R1 (denoted R1  R2) if three conditions are
met:
(a) all agents which appear in R1, appear in R2 (i.e.
⋃
T1∈R1
T1 ⊆
⋃
T2∈R2
T2)
(b) two agents which are in the same coalition in R1, are in the same coalition in R2
(c) two agents which are not in the same coalition in R1 are not in the same coalition
in R2.
Assume R1  R2. Based on the presented conditions, as we delete agents from R2
which are not in R1, we get exactly the R1 configuration. This observation can be
expressed in an alternative definition of the -operator.
Proposition 4.2. Let R1, R2 be two proper, non-empty subsets of two partitions. Then:
4
R1  R2 ⇔ ∃S⊆NR1 = {T2 \ S : T2 ∈ R2 and T2 6⊆ S} ∨R1 = {∅}
For example {{1, 2}, {3}}  {{1, 2, 4}, {3}, {5}} but {{1, 2}, {3}} 6 {{1, 2, 3}} and
{{1, 2}, {3}} 6 {{1}, {3, 4}}.
Now we can introduce our new basis for games with externalities.
Definition 4.3. For every embedded coalition (S, P ), the constant-coalition game e(S,P )
is defined by
e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ )
def
=
{
(|P | − 1)−(|S˜\S|) if (P˜−S˜  P−S) and (|P | = |P˜ |),
0 otherwise,
for every (S˜, P˜ ) ∈ EC.
Note that (P˜−S˜  P−S) implies S ⊆ S˜ as we get N˜ \ S˜ ⊆ N \ S from the (a)
condition in -operator definition. So, in our game, e(S,P ) non-zero values have only
embedded coalitions formed from (S, P ) by some transition of agents from P \ {S} to
S which does not change the number of the coalitions.
Lemma 4.4. The collection of constant-coalition games is a basis of the partition func-
tion games.
4 The equivalence of the definitions when R1 and R2 contain only non-empty coalitions is
easy to see. As the only partition which contains an empty set is {N, ∅} then the only
proper, non-empty subset of the partition which contains an empty set is {∅}. Based on the
first definition {∅}  R2 for every R2 and R1  {∅} implies R1 = {∅} (as we don’t allow
empty R1).
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Proof. Let e = (e(S,P ))(S,P )∈EC be the vector of all games.
First, we will show that the constant-coalition games are linearly independent. Sup-
pose the contrary. Then there exists a vector of weights α = (α(S,P ))(S,P )∈EC with at
least one non-zero value such that α × e =
∑
(S,P )∈EC α(S,P )e
(S,P ) is a zero vector.
Let (S∗, P ∗) be the embedded coalition with a non-zero weight α(S∗,P∗) 6= 0 and
minimal S∗ (i.e. (S∗, P ∗) is the minimal element of the embedded-coalition relation
r: (S1, P1)r(S2, P2) ⇔ S1 ⊆ S2). So, for any other game e(S,P ) either α(S,P ) = 0 or
S 6⊆ S∗ ⇒ e(S,P )(S∗, P ∗) = 0 (the implication follows from the remarks after Definition
4.3). Then∑
(S,P )∈EC
α(S,P )e
(S,P )(S∗, P ∗) = α(S∗,P∗)e
(S∗,P∗)(S∗, P ∗) = α(S∗,P∗) 6= 0,
contrary to the previous assumption.
The size of a collection of all the constant-coalition games is equal to the dimension
of the partition function games space, hence the collection must be a basis. ⊓⊔
5 Uniqueness of the Value
In this section we show that there exists only one value that satisfies all the introduced
axioms and that it is equivalent to the value proposed by McQuillin.
Theorem 5.1. There is a unique value ϕfull satisfying Efficiency, Symmetry, Linear-
ity and Null-player Axiom (in a steady marginality sense).
Proof. We will show that in every coalition-constant game there exists only one value
which satisfies those axioms. Based on Linearity and Lemma 4.4 this will imply our
theorem.
Let e(S,P ) be one of the coalition-constant games. We will show that any player i
from the coalition other than S is a null-player (in a steady marginality sense). Based
on the Definition 3.5 we have to prove that mci(e
(S,P )) is a zero vector. So, for every
(S˜, P˜ ) ∈ EC such that i ∈ S˜:
mc(i,S˜,P˜)(e
(S,P )) =
∑
T˜∈P˜\{S˜}
e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ )− e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T˜
i (P˜ )) = 0
We divide the proof into two cases with zero and non-zero value of e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ ).
Lemma 5.2. If e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ ) = 0 then, for every T ∈ P˜ \ {S˜},
e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T
i (P˜ )) = 0.
Proof. Based on the definition of the coalition-constant games we can deduce that at
least one of the following conditions occurs:
– P˜−S˜ 6 P−S - from the definition of -operator we know that there is an agent in
P˜−S˜ which is not in P−S , or there is a pair of agents which are together in one and
not together in the other structure; it is easy to see, that adding player i to some
coalition in P˜−S˜ will not fix any of these anomalies;
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– |P | 6= |P˜ | - if i is alone (S˜ = {i}) then, for every T ∈ P˜ \ {S˜},
e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T
i (P˜ )) = e
(S,P )(∅, τ S˜,Ti (P˜ )) = 0;
otherwise, as we only consider the transfer of an agent i to the other existing
coalition, the number of the coalitions remains intact: |P | 6= |τ S˜,Ti (P˜ )|. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5.3. If e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ ) = x for x > 0 then there exists only one T ∗ ∈ P˜ \ {S˜}
such that e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T∗
i (P˜ )) has non-zero value. Moreover, this value is equal to
x(|P | − 1).
Proof. If e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ ) > 0 and e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T
i (P˜ )) > 0 then from the definition:
e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T
i (P˜ )) = (|P | − 1)
−|S˜−i\S| = (|P | − 1) · (|P | − 1)−|S˜\S|
= (|P | − 1) · e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ )
which proves the values equality part.
First we will consider a special case when P˜ contains the empty coalition. Then
P˜ = {N, ∅} (as it is the only partition with the empty coalition) and the only transition
of i is allowed to the empty coalition: (S˜, τ S˜,Ti (P˜ )) is equal (N−i, {N−i, {i}}). As we
assumed i 6∈ S, we know that {i}  P−S and as we’re not changing the partition size
(|{N, ∅}| = |{N−i, {i}}|) this follows that e(S,P )(N−i, {N−i, {i}}) > 0 and finishes this
case.
Now let’s assume that all the coalitions in P˜ are non-empty. Let Ti ∈ P \ S be
the agent’s i coalition. From the constant-games definition we know that P−S can be
reduced to P˜−S˜ and that in both there is the same number of the coalitions: |P−S | =
|P˜−S˜ |. As the agents from one coalition cannot be separated, there must be some non-
empty coalition T˜i in P˜−S˜ which can be reduced from Ti by deleting agents from S˜.
It must contain at least one agent denoted by j (and j 6= i, because i ∈ S˜). So when
we consider a transition to any other coalition than T˜i we will separate i and j agents
which will violate (c) condition in -operator definition and imply zero value in e(S,P )
game. But in τ S˜,T˜ii (P ) all the conditions will be satisfied – (a) is obviously satisfied
as i 6∈ S and P˜−S˜ was already a subset of P−S ; (b) and (c) are satisfied because the
relations between an additional i agent are equal to the relations of j who is already
in the structure.
Again, we do not change the size of the partition. We have to check only one special
case when S˜ = {i}. But from e(S,P )(S˜, P˜ ) > 0 we get S ⊆ S˜ and as we know that i 6∈ S
we get S = ∅ which means that the game e(S,P ) is incorrect.
So, finally: e(S,P )(S˜−i, τ
S˜,T˜i
i (P˜ )) > 0. ⊓⊔
From Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 we have that every agent i 6∈ S is a null-player
(in a steady marginality sense). Based on our Null-player Axiom (Definition 3.5),
ϕ
full
i (e
(S,P )) = 0 and based on Symmetry (Definition 3.2) and Efficiency (Definition
3.1) we get:
ϕ
full
j (e
(S,P )) =
1
|S|
·
∑
j∈S
ϕ
full
j (e
(S,P )) =
1
|S|
· e(S,P )(N, {N, ∅}).
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As our value ϕfull clearly satisfies Efficiency, Linearity and Symmetry, the only
observation we need to add is that it also satisfies Null-player Axiom. As agents not
from S are null-players and get nothing it would be sufficient to show that no agent
from S is a null-player. But every agent j from S has a non-zero marginal contribution
to (S, P ): e(S,P )(S, P ) = 1 and e(S,P )(S−j , τ
S,T
j (P )) = 0 for every T ∈ P \ S. That
finishes the proof of Theorem 5.1. ⊓⊔
Now let us show that our unique value is indeed equal to the value proposed by
McQuillin.
Theorem 5.4. Let v be a game with externalities. Then ϕMcQ(v) = ϕfull(v).
Proof. Again, based on Linearity, we will show the adequacy on the constant-coalition
games. In the proof of Theorem 5.1 we have showed that ϕfulli (e
(S,P )) = 0 for every
i 6∈ S and ϕfullj (e
(S,P )) = 1|S| · e
(S,P )(N, {N, ∅}) for every j ∈ S.
Let (S, P ) be an embedded coalition. Assume that |P | > 2. As |{N, ∅}| = 2 6=
|P |, based on the definition of the constant-coalition games (Definition 4.3) we get
e(S,P )(N, {N, ∅}) = 0 and ϕfulli (e
(S,P )) = 0 for every agent i ∈ N . Also ϕMcQi (e
(S,P )) =
0 for every agent i ∈ N , because vˆMcQ(S) = 0 for every S ⊆ N as no embedded coalition
of form (S˜, {S˜, N \ S˜}) has a non-zero value in e(S,P ) (the reason here is the same –
the partitions sizes do not match).
If |P | = 2 then embedded coalition has the form (S, {S,N \ S}) and e(S,{S,N\S})
assigns a non-zero value (equal 1) only to an embedded coalition (S˜, {S˜, N \ S˜) such
that S ⊆ S˜. Hence, vˆMcQ(S˜) = 1 when S ⊆ S˜ and vˆ(S˜) = 0 otherwise. Based on
the basic Shapley’s axioms for vˆMcQ we get that ϕMcQi (e
(S,P )) = 0 for i 6∈ S and
ϕ
McQ
j (e
(S,P )) = Shj(vˆ) =
1
|S| for j ∈ S.
Let’s check if our value has the same results. As mentioned at the beginning of the
proof, for i 6∈ S, ϕfulli (e
(S,P )) = 0 and for j ∈ S, ϕfullj (e
(S,P )) = 1|S| ·e
(S,P )(N, {N, ∅}) =
1
|S| which completes the proof. ⊓⊔
6 A Comparison of Various Marginality Definitions
In this section we examine various approaches to marginality more broadly and we
compare them with steady marginality.
In Section 3 we have presented the universal definition of marginality:
mc(i,S,P )(v) =
∑
T∈P−S∪{∅}
α(i,S,P,T )(v(S, P )− v(S−i, τ
S,T
i (P )))
Based on the accepted definition of marginal contribution we define a vector of marginal
contributions mci(v) = (mc(i,S,P )(v))(S,P )∈EC,i∈S .
It seems reasonable to normalize the weights by assuming that the sum of them
is equal 1:
∑
T∈P−S∪{∅}
α(i,S,P,T ) = 1 for each (S, P ) ∈ EC such that i ∈ S. As we
have considered only 0-1 weights we have omitted this step to increase the clarity of
the presentation. But it is important to notice, that with respect to the conventional
axioms based on the marginality this normalization is not significant as we compare
mc(i,S,P ) only to the same marginal contribution in other game (in Bolger [5] and De
Clipper and Serrano [7] from mci(v1) = mci(v2) we conclude ϕi(v1) = ϕi(v2)) or to
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zero (in Hu and Yang [6] and our paper from mci(v1) = 0 we conclude that ϕi(v) = 0).
Thus, the only important aspect is the weight ratio.
In all the definitions of marginal contribution proposed in the literature α(i,N,{N,∅},∅) =
1.5 Thus, in the rest of this section we assume, that P 6= {N, ∅}.
Chronologically, the first definition of marginality proposed is also the most intuitive
one. Bolger [5] defined the marginality as a simple average of all the elementary marginal
contributions:
αB(i,S,P,T ) = 1 for T ∈ P−S ∪ {∅}
In his paper, Bolger studied the basic games – games with only 0-1 values. Thus, his
marginal contribution is the number of partitions from which agent’s transfer turns the
S−i coalition value (negative if value of S is zero). Unfortunately, there is no closed
form expression for Bolger’s value.
Steady marginality is quite similar to Bolger’s one:
α
full
(i,S,P,T ) = 1 for T ∈ P−S and α
full
(i,S,P,T ) = 0 otherwise
We have also already introduced the marginality proposed by De Clipper and Serrano:
α
free
(i,S,P,T ) = 1 for T = ∅ and α
free
(i,S,P,T ) = 0 otherwise
It is easy to see, that our marginality complements De Clipper and Serrano’s marginal-
ity to Bolger’s one.
Another approach was proposed by Hu and Yang [6]. Their marginality assigns the
same weight to the transfer to every existing coalition and higher value for the partition
where i is alone:
αHY(i,S,P,T ) = 1 for T ∈ P−S and α
HY
(i,S,P,T ) = 1 + r otherwise
where 1 + r =
|{P∗∈P:(τS,∅
i
(P )\{S−i})P
∗}|
|{P∗∈P:(τS,T
i
(P )\{S−i})P∗}|
for any T ∈ P−S .6 It can be shown, that
r ≥ 0.
Let us consider a simple environment in which there exists m political parties – S(j)
for every j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} – and one independent agent i (i.e. N = {i} ∪
⋃
j S
(j)). Let
P = {S(j) : j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}} ∪ {{i}} and define P (j) = τ
{i},S(j)
i (P ). Assume that an
agent i does not have any political power on his own, but by joining one of the parties
he increases the coalition value by (m− 1) and decreases the values of other parties by
1, thus: v(S
(j)
+i , P
(j)) = v(S(j), P )+ (m− 1) and v(S(j), P (k)) = v(S(j), P )− 1 for every
S(j), S(k) ∈ P and S(j) 6= S(k).
Consider the marginal contribution of an agent i to the coalition S
(j)
+i . As we nor-
malize weights (in a way mentioned before) based on non-existing marginality we get
5 Assume that α(i,N,{N,∅},∅) = 0, then mc(i,N,{N,∅}) = 0 regardless of v(N, {N, ∅})
and v(N−i, {N, {i}}). So, in game with only one non-zero value for grand-coalition
v(N, {N, ∅}) = 1 all the marginal contributions are equal zero which is unintuitive and
with every axiom based on marginality results in a contradiction.
6 That definition may seem wrong, as it might not be obvious, why |{P ∗ ∈ P : (τS,Ti (P ) \
{S−i})  P
∗}| is equal for every T ∈ P−S . It appears, that |{P
∗ ∈ P : P˜−S˜  P
∗}| depends
only on |P˜ | and |S˜| and grows with increasing |P˜ |. That also explains why the numerator
is larger than the denominator in 1 + r fractional definition.
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mc
full
(i,S
(j)
+i ,P
(j))
= m as we exclude a non-realistic situation from the consideration – when
agent i decides to waste his potential. De Clippel and Serrano consider only this one
situation and get mcfree
(i,S
(j)
+i ,P
(j))
= m− 1. Bolger reaches some compromise, as he does
not differentiate partitions: mcB
(i,S
(j)
+i ,P
(j))
= m − 1
m
. The last marginal contribution
mcHY
(i,S
(j)
+i ,P
(j))
is slightly smaller than Bolger’s and depends on the size of S(j) and the
number of parties.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the problem of finding a fair division of jointly gained
payoff in coalition games with externalities. We have presented an innovative approach
to marginality in which the contribution of an agent to the coalition is evaluated only
in reference to the partitions where the agent is not alone. This allowed us to define
a new version of Null-player Axiom which, together with Efficiency, Symmetry and
Linearity, uniquely determines a division scheme. We have proved that this value is
equal to the one proposed earlier by McQuillin.
Our work can be extended in various directions. It is not clear if any of the adopted
axioms can be dropped (just as De Clippel and Serrano based their value only on
Symmetry, Efficiency and their version of Marginality axiom). Another question is
whether there exist any other definitions of marginality which lead to McQuillin’s
value. Looking a bit further, it would be interesting to find any universal link between
the definition of marginality and the formula for the value derived from it. Finally,
other approaches to marginality axioms can be studied.
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